Introduction
Conservative accounting recognizes losses as they are discovered, but defers gains until they are verified. Consequently, bad news is more timely reflected in accounting earnings than good news. Accounting conservatism can reduce agency problems arising from managers' opportunistic use of accounting discretion. Prior research (e.g., Watts, 1993; Ahmed et al., 2002; Zhang, 2008) investigates the economic consequence of accounting conservatism. These studies suggest that accounting conservatism can increase the efficiency of contracts written between conflicted parties. Prior research also examines the economic determinants of accounting conservatism. For example, Ahmed and Duellman (2007) find that board governance quality is positively associated with accounting conservatism. Likewise, Garcia Lara et al. (2009) document a positive association between accounting conservatism and a composite measure of corporate governance quality. These studies suggest that strong corporate governance may lead to more conservative accounting.
Analysts play an information intermediary role in the capital market because their work involves interpreting, acquiring, and communicating information for other market participants. These information intermediary duties facilitate analysts to monitor the management. Analysts can effectively scrutinize firms' financial reporting because they have great experience on tracking corporate financial statements and substantial industrywide knowledge. Recently, Yu (2008) and Knyazeva (2007) find that firms with high analyst coverage engage in less earnings management than do firms with low analyst coverage, suggesting that analysts play an important monitoring role in financial reporting. Analyst coverage may directly or indirectly affect managers' accounting choices. Analysts can directly monitor the management by issuing research reports and raising questions when they interact with the management. Analysts may also indirectly monitor the management by alerting other corporate governance mechanisms including board of directors and external auditors so that the later ones can more effectively monitor firms' financial reporting. Thus, high analyst coverage may lead to high accounting conservatism if analyst coverage serves as a corporate governance role.
On the other hand, high analyst coverage can mitigate information asymmetry between managers and outside investors as analysts play an information intermediary role. LaFond and Watts (2008) argue that accounting conservatism can reduce managers' incentives and ability to manipulate accounting numbers and so reduce information asymmetry. They find that firms with more information asymmetry demand more accounting conservatism. Their findings suggest that high analyst coverage may lead to a low demand for accounting conservatism because information asymmetry is low for firms with high analyst coverage. Therefore, it is not clear whether high analyst coverage increases or decreases accounting conservatism. If analysts' monitoring role dominates over their information intermediary role in firms' accounting choices, we expect a positive association between analyst coverage and accounting conservatism. However, analyst coverage will be negatively associated with accounting conservatism if the effect of analysts' information intermediary role on accounting choices is greater than that of analysts' monitoring role. This study examines whether high analyst coverage increases or decreases accounting conservatism. Using a sample of 9,924 firm-year observations over the period 1989 to 2006, we document strong evidence that firms adopt more conservative accounting when they are followed by more analysts than when they are followed by fewer analysts. The results still hold after allowing for the autocorrelation of time-series data, the endogeneity of analyst coverage, the potential confounding effects of competing corporate governance mechanisms, and using asymmetric loss recognition test. These findings are consistent with the notion that analyst coverage plays an important corporate governance role in the financial reporting process.
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, this study sheds light on how analyst coverage affects firms' accounting choices. Since whether analyst coverage positively or negatively affects accounting conservatism is not clear in the literature, it is warranted to make some clarifications on this issue. Second, this study extends the limited research on the monitoring role of analyst coverage. Unlike Yu (2008) and Knyazeva (2007) , we focus on conservative accounting choices. This study provides further evidence on analysts' governance role by examining the relationship between analyst coverage and accounting conservatism. Third, this study also adds to the literature on the economic determinants of accounting conservatism. Although prior research (e.g., Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Garcia Lara et al., 2009) finds that high quality corporate governance increases accounting conservatism, this is the first study to examine whether governance mechanism arising from analyst coverage affects accounting conservatism. This study provides further evidence to support the argument that there exists a positive impact of corporate governance on accounting conservatism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the economic determinants of accounting conservatism. Section 3 discusses role of analysts. Section 4 develops the hypotheses. Section 5 addresses the research design. Section 6 presents empirical results. Section 7 concludes.
Economic determinants of accounting conservatism
There is a growing literature that examines the economic determinants of accounting conservatism. Ahmed et al. (2002) investigate the relationship between accounting conservatism and bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividend policy. They find that firms facing more severe bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividend policy adopt more conservative accounting. Lobo and Zhou (2006) examine whether the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act affects accounting conservatism. They document evidence on an increase in conservatism in financial reporting following the SarbanesOxley Act. Bushman and Piotroski (2006) examine whether legal and political institutions affect financial reporting incentives for conservative accounting. They find that accounting is more conservative in countries with both high quality judicial regimes and high relative usage of private bonds, and in countries with both high quality judicial regimes and more diffuse ownership structures. Ahmed and Duellman (2007) examine the association between accounting conservatism and board characteristics. They find that accounting conservatism is positively associated with the proportion of outside directors and the percentage of outside directors' shareholding, suggesting that accounting conservatism can assist outside directors in reducing agency costs. Using a sample of listed companies in Spain, Garcia Lara et al. (2007) find that accounting conservatism decreases in the CEO's influence over the board of directors, measured by board characteristics including board size, the proportion of non-executive directors, the proportion of independent directors, the existence of a executive board chairman, and the existence of an audit committee, a nomination or remuneration committee, and an executive committee. Chung and Wynn (2008) investigate the effect of managerial legal liability coverage on accounting conservatism. Using directors' and officers' liability insurance coverage and cash for indemnification as a proxy for managerial legal liability coverage, they find that accounting earnings are less conservative for firms with high managerial legal liability coverage than for firms with low managerial legal liability coverage. Jenkins and Velury (2008) examine whether auditor tenure affects accounting conservatism, and find that earnings conservatism is positively associated with the length of the auditor-client relationship. LaFond and Watts (2008) find that accounting conservatism increases in information asymmetry between managers and outside investors. Their findings suggest that firms with high information asymmetry have a higher demand for conservatism in financial reporting. LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) argue that the high severity of agency problem increases the demand for accounting conservatism, and find a negative association between managerial ownership and accounting conservatism. Using a composite measure of corporate governance, Garcia Lara et al. (2009) also find that stronger corporate governance is associated with a high degree of accounting conservatism in U.S. Nichols et al. (2009) examine whether there is a difference in the degree of accounting conservatism between public and private banks. They find that public banks adopt more conservative accounting than private banks as the former faces greater agency costs.
Role of analysts
Analysts play an information intermediary role in the capital market as they can interpret public information, and acquire and convey private information to investors (Healy and Palepu, 2001 ). There is a large body of research that examines the information intermediary role of analysts. For instance, Hong et al. (2000) examine whether analyst coverage affects the profitability of momentum strategies. They find that momentum strategies are less profitable for firms with high analyst coverage, suggesting that information about those firms is more available to the investing public. Ayers and Freeman (2003) investigate the association between analyst coverage and the pricing of future earnings, and document that prices incorporate future earnings earlier for firms with high analyst coverage than for firms with low analyst coverage. Frankel and Li (2004) use insider trading profits as a proxy for information asymmetry between managers and outside investors. They find that insider trading profits are lower when firms have high analyst coverage. These studies suggest that the information intermediary role of analysts mitigates information asymmetry.
Analysts can also monitor financial reporting in the process of information intermediary. For example, analysts can interact directly with the management and raise questions in earnings release conferences. Since analysts have great experience on tracking corporate financial statements and substantial industry-wide knowledge, they can effectively scrutinize firms' financial reporting. Thus, analyst coverage can act as a magnifying lens of managerial opportunism. Dyck et al. (2006) find that analysts are more likely to detect corporate fraud than the Securities and Exchange Commission and auditors. This suggests that analyst coverage is an effective channel to monitor managers.
Although analysts can play an important corporate governance role, the research on this topic is limited in the literature. The governance role of analyst coverage has been investigated by Yu (2008) and Knyazeva (2007) . Yu (2008) examines whether analyst coverage affects earnings management. He finds that analyst coverage is negatively associated with the level of discretionary accruals, suggesting that firms followed by more analysts engage in less earning management than firms followed by fewer analysts. Moreover, he finds that firms with high analyst coverage are less likely to just beat or meet earnings benchmarks than firms with low analyst coverage, consistent with the results based on discretionary accruals. Knyazeva (2007) investigates the effect of analyst coverage on firm behavior. She also documents a negative association between analyst coverage and earnings management, and argues that analyst coverage can serve as a partial substitute to other governance mechanisms in constraining earnings management.
Hypotheses development
Agency costs can be mitigated by writing contracts between the parties with conflicting interests. Since accounting numbers are used in the contracts, managers may have incentives to adopt aggressive accounting policies to defer (expedite) the recognition of losses (gains) at the expense of some parties' interests. As a result, contracting itself cannot fully solve the agency problems. Corporate governance mechanisms can improve the efficiency of contracts and reduce agency problems by monitoring firms' financial reporting. Watts (1993) suggests that accounting conservatism increases the efficiency of debt contracts written between shareholders and bondholders. Accounting conservatism can also reduce managers' short-term behavior to expropriate shareholders' wealth because conservative accounting has the propensity to recognize losses earlier and gains later (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005) . Thus, accounting conservatism is an important way to reduce agency costs, which is expected in a strong corporate governance environment. Consistent with this notion, Garcia Lara et al. (2009) document evidence that strong corporate governance leads to more accounting conservatism. Since analyst coverage serves as a corporate governance mechanism through issuing research reports and raising questions when analysts interact with managers, firms with high analyst coverage are more likely to have high corporate governance quality and so adopt more conservative accounting.
Analysts' reputations and compensation depend on the quality of their research and the accuracy of their forecasts and recommendations. Analysts have incentives to search for private information in order to increase their job performance. Through acquiring private information, analysts may enhance the effectiveness of firms' other corporate governance mechanisms in monitoring financial reporting. For example, bad news can be more quickly communicated to the public by analysts when firms are followed by more analysts. This will give a warning signal to outside directors and external auditors in these firms that they should be concerned with the firms' accounting treatment of bad news. Thus, bad news could be more quickly incorporated into accounting numbers when firms have high analyst coverage. Based on the above discussions, we hypothesize that firms with high analyst coverage adopt more conservative accounting than do firms with low analyst coverage. The first hypothesis is formulated as follows:
H1 Analyst coverage is positively associated with accounting conservatism. While monitoring financial reporting, analysts also interpret and produce information to the investing public. Prior research (e.g., Hong et al., 2000; Frankel and Li, 2004) suggests that high analyst coverage can reduce information asymmetry between managers and outside investors. LaFond and Watts (2008) examine the effect of information asymmetry on accounting conservatism. They find that firms with more information asymmetry adopt more conservative accounting than do firms with less information asymmetry. Since high analyst coverage leads to less information asymmetry, we also hypothesize that accounting is less conservative for firms with high analyst coverage than for firms with low analyst coverage. Thus, the second hypothesis is developed as follows:
H2. Analyst coverage is negatively associated with accounting conservatism.
Research design

Data collection
We begin to select all firm-year observations over the period 1988 to 2007 from the Compustat's industrial annual data file.
1 Since data for year t-1 to t+1 are used for computing the measure of accounting conservatism at year t, the sample period for testing the hypothesis is 1989 to 2006. Next, the raw sample from Compustat is merged with the I/B/E/S detail file to identify firms that are covered by both Compustat and I/B/E/S. After excluding observations with missing data for computing accrual-based measure of accounting conservatism and independent variables used in the main analysis, the final sample consists of 9,924 firm-year observations over the period 1989 to 2006. Table I reports the frequency and percent of sample firms for each two-digit SIC industry from which there are at least 100 observations in the sample. Industries including business services (17.86%), electrical and electronic equipment (11.32%), industrial machinery and equipment (10.42%), instruments and related products (9.67%), and chemicals and allied products (9.52%) are most widely represented in the sample. In addition, the sample size is reduced to 5,148 firm-year observations when market-value-based measure of accounting conservatism is used for testing the hypothesis. 
Measure of accounting conservatism
Following Ahmed et al. (2002) , we use both an accrual-based and a market-valuebased measure of accounting conservatism. The accrual-based measure of accounting conservatism (i.e., CONAC) is computed as the mean of total accruals deflated by total assets for year t-1 to t+1 where t is the year of interest, multiplied by -1.
3 Like Givoly and Hayn (2000), we measure total accruals as net income before extraordinary items plus depreciation less cash flow from operations. 4 Since CONAC increases in the amount of negative accruals, a high value of CONAC indicates a high level of accounting conservatism.
The market-value-based measure of accounting conservatism (i.e., CONBM) is computed by estimating the following fixed-effect regression model: BM it = the book-to-market ratio for firm i at year t, RET it -k = the stock return (including dividends) for firm i at year t-k.
Equation (1) is estimated for year t-1 to t+1, where t is the year of interest. 5 α i is the firm-specific bias component of the book-to-market ratio, which reflects a firm's accounting conservatism relative to the other firms in the sample. α t is the year-specific bias component of the book-to-market ratio. Based on prior research (e.g., Beaver and Ryan, 2000; Ahmed et al., 2002) , CONBM is measured as α i , multiplied by -1. High accounting conservatism is expected to yield higher values of CONBM.
Regression analysis
The following regression model is used for testing the hypotheses: forecasts of year t+1's earnings per share for a firm during year t (Yu, 2008) , DIV = common dividends divided by total assets, DEBT = long-term debt divided by total assets, ROA = net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets, SIZE = the logarithm of total assets, SGROW = the annual percentage change in sales, RDADV = the sum of R&D expense and advertising expense divided by sales.
The coefficient on ANALYST, i.e., b 1 , will be positive and significant if H 1 is supported, but will be negative and significant if H 2 is supported. We include DIV and DEBT in equation (1) to control for the effect of bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividend policy on accounting conservatism (Ahmed et al., 2002) . Since firms demand for more accounting conservatism when bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividend policy are severer, the coefficients on both DIV and DEBT, i.e., b 2 and b 3 , are expected to be positive.
Following Ahmed et al. (2002) , we also add other variables in the regression to control for profitability, size, sales growth, and growth opportunities. Ahmed et al. (2002) argue that high profitable firms can better afford accounting conservatism. Thus, earnings profitability may positively affect accounting conservatism. The coefficient on ROA, i.e., b 4 , is expected to be positive when CONBM is used in the regression. However, we expect that b 4 will be negative when CONAC is used in the regression because Ahmed et al. (2002) suggest that the mechanical, negative association between CONAC and ROA dominates the positive association between accounting conservatism and profitability. Large firms have high political costs, resulting in high accounting conservatism (Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981) . Thus, the coefficient on SIZE, i.e., b 5 , is expected to be positive. Like Ahmed et al. (2002) , we expect that the coefficient on SGROW, i.e., b 6 , will be negative or positive when CONAC or CONBM is used in the regression, respectively, because sales growth may positively affect either accruals or the market's expectation of future growth reflected in CONBM. Klein (2002) suggests that growth opportunities are positively associated with aggressive accounting choices.
Moreover, growth opportunities may be captured in CONBM. Thus, the coefficient on RDADV, i.e., b 7 , is expected to be negative or positive when CONAC or CONBM is used in the regression, respectively. To control for the industry-fixed effect and the year-fixed effect, we include both industry dummies and year dummies in the regression model. 6 We conduct the main analysis by estimating equation (2) on pooled data over the period 1989 to 2006.
We also conduct several additional regression analyses. First, we estimate equation (2) separately for each year to apply Fama-MacBeth test to avoid the autocorrelation of time-series data in the pooled regression. Fama-MacBeth test is based on the separate estimation of equation (2) for each of 18 years, i.e., 1989-2006. 7 . Second, we run the two-stage regression to allow for the potential endogeneity of analyst coverage. The relationship between accounting policy and analyst coverage is likely to be endogenous because analysts can self-select firms. We estimate the firststage model as follows: ANALYST = a 0 + a 1 SPIND + a 2 DEBT + a 3 ROA + a 4 SIZE + a 5 RDADV + ε (3) In equation (3), SPIND is a dummy variable coded "1" if a firm is included in the S&P 500 index and "0" otherwise. Following Yu (2008) , we choose SPIND as the instrumental variable because it can capture the variations in analyst coverage that are exogenous to firms' accounting choices. We include DEBT, ROA, SIZE, and RDADV in equation (3) since prior research (e.g., Yu, 2008; Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary, 2006) suggests that these firm characteristics may affect analyst coverage. The second-stage model (i.e., equation (2)) is estimated by replacing ANALYST with the fitted value of ANALYST from equation (3) 
(i.e., ANALYST_F).
Third, we examine whether the role of analysts in increasing accounting conservatism is dominated over or overlapped by the role of outside directors and institutional shareholders. We consider these two competing governance mechanisms because they may affect managerial behavior in choosing accounting policy. Klein (2002) finds that outside directors play an important role in constraining earnings management. Koh (2007) suggests that long-term institutional shareholders can reduce aggressive earnings management. Thus, equation (2) ACC = accruals, measured as income before extraordinary items less cash flow from operations deflated by the beginning total assets, DP = a dummy variable coded "1" if cash flow from operations is negative and "0" otherwise, CFO = cash flow from operations deflated by the beginning total assets, BM = the book value of common equity divided by the market value of common equity, SALES = sales divided by total assets. In equation (5), the coefficient on CFO is expected to be negative, while the coefficient on DP*CFO is expected to be positive (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005) . The positive coefficient on DP*CFO means that negative cash flow from operations is more timely recognized via accruals than positive cash flow from operations, which reflects accounting conservatism. Thus, the coefficient on ANALYST*DP*CFO can capture the effect of analyst coverage on accounting conservatism. If firms with high analyst coverage adopt more (less) conservative accounting choices, b 6 is expected to be significantly positive (negative). We add several firm characteristics including DEBT, ROA, SIZE, SGROW, BM, and SALES as prior research (e.g., Klein, 2002; Ahmed et al., 2002) suggests that they may affect the level of accruals. The coefficients on ROA, SGROW, and SLAES are expected to be positive, while the coefficients on DEBT, SIZE, and BM are expected to be negative.
Empirical results
Table II presents descriptive statistics of the variables. The mean of CONAC is 0.018, suggesting that on average accruals are negative. The mean of CONBM is 0.221. Usually, there are about nine analysts following a firm, consistent with the average number of analyst followings in Yu (2008) . The mean return on assets is 0.001, which is close to that in Yu (2008) . The mean total assets of the sample firms are $359 million. Notes: CONAC is accrual-based measure of accounting conservatism, measured as the mean of total accruals deflated by total assets for year t-1 to t+1 where t is the year of interest, multiplied by -1. CONBM is market-value-based measure of accounting conservatism, measured as the firm-specific bias component of the book-to-market ratio, which is estimated using equation (1). ANALYST is analyst coverage, measured as the total number of analysts who issue forecasts of year t+1's earnings per share for a firm during year t (Yu, 2008) . DIV is common dividends divided by total assets. DEBT is long-term debt divided by total assets. ROA = net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. SGROW is the annual percentage change in sales. RDADV is the sum of R&D expense and advertising expense divided by total assets. Table III reports Pearson correlations among the independent variables. Large firms are followed by more analysts (r = 0.59). Firms with high R&D and advertising intensity are less profitable (r = -0.53). Since the absolute values of all correlation coefficients are less than 0.60, multicollinearity is unlikely to be a severe issue for the regression. Notes: ***, ** significant at 1% and 5% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). Table IV provides the main results on testing the hypotheses. Columns 3 and 4 in Table IV report the results when the accrual-based measure of accounting conservatism is used as the dependent variable. We find that the association between CONAC and ANALYST is significantly positive (t-statistic = 7.46, p-value < 0.01), consistent with H 1 but inconsistent with H 2 . This suggests that firms adopt more conservative accounting choices when they are followed by more analysts. Thus, the effect of analysts' monitoring role on accounting conservatism dominates over that of analysts' information intermediary role. In addition, we find that CONAC is positively associated with DIV, consistent with the notion that firms with severe bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividend policy employ more conservative accounting (Ahmed et al., 2002) . A strong negative relation between CONAC and ROA is documented, suggesting that the mechanical relation dominates the relation between accounting conservatism and profitability. We find that large firms are more conservative in accounting choices when conservatism is measured by CONAC. Contrary to the prediction, sales growth is positively associated with CONAC. As expected, firms with high growth opportunities have low CONAC. Notes: The regression model is equation (2). ***, ** significant at 1% and 5% levels, respectively (twotailed tests).
Columns 6 and 7 in Table IV present the results when CONBM is used as a proxy for accounting conservatism. We find that CONBM is positively associated with ANALYST (t-statistic = 6.44, p-value < 0.01), supporting H 1 . The results suggest that high analyst coverage can increase accounting conservatism. We also find that CONBM is high when firms have severe bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividend policy measured by either DIV or DEBT. As opposed to CONAC, CONBM is positively associated with profitability. The results show that CONBM is negatively associated with SIZE, inconsistent with the prediction. Also, we document that CONBM is positively associated with SGROW. Table V reports the results using Fama-MacBeth test. When CONAC is used as the dependent variable, the results show that the mean coefficient on ANALYST is significantly positive (t-statistic = 4.70, p-value <0.01), consistent with H 1 . Similar to the results using the pooled regression, CONAC is positively associated with DIV and SIZE, and is negatively associated with ROA and RDADV. When accounting conservatism is measured by CONBM, we find a positive association between CONBM and ANALYST (tstatistic = 3.86, p-value <0.01), suggesting that analyst coverage positively affects accounting conservatism. We also find that CONBM is positively related to DIV, DEBT, and SGROW. Unlike the results of the main analysis, CONBM is only marginally significantly associated with SIZE, and is positively associated with RDADV. Notes: ***, **, and * significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests).
Table VI presents the results on the two-stage model. We find that CONAC is positively related to ANALYST_F (t-statistic = 2.89, p-value <0.01), which supports the hypothesis. We also find that CONAC is positively related to DIV, SIZE, and SGROW, and is negatively related to ROA and RDADV. Similarly, we document a positive relationship between CONBM and ANALYST_F (t-statistic = 2.50, p-value <0.05). Again, we find that CONBM is positively related to DIV, DEBT, ROA, and SGROW, and is negatively related to SIZE. Thus, the results still hold after controlling for the endogeneity of analyst coverage. (2). ***, **, and * significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). Table VII reports the results after controlling for the possible effects of board independence and institutional shareholding on accounting conservatism. We still find that analyst coverage positively affects accounting conservatism measured by either CONAC or CONBM (t-statistic = 2.25 or 5.21, p-value < 0.05 or 0.01, respectively), consistent with H 1 . Nevertheless, we do not document any significant evidence on the association of accounting conservatism with board independence and institutional shareholding. Overall, these results suggest that it is less likely that analyst coverage is dominated over or overlapped by the competing governance mechanisms of boards and institutional shareholders in terms of increasing accounting conservatism. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) , we find that the coefficient on CFO is negative, and that the coefficient on DP*CFO is positive. Similarly, we find that the coefficient on the three-way interaction term ANALYST*DP*CFO is positive and significant (t-statistic = 7.09, p-value < 0.01). Thus, the extent to which negative cash flow from operations is more timely recognized via accruals than positive cash flow from operations (i.e., another proxy for accounting conservatism) is positively associated with analyst coverage. This supports the hypothesis that firms with high analyst coverage adopt more conservative accounting choices. In addition, we find that total accruals are positively associated with ROA and SALES, and are negatively associated with DEBT, SIZE, SGROW, and BM. 
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Notes: The regression model is equation (5). ***, ** significant at 1% and 5% levels, respectively (twotailed tests).
Conclusion
This study examines whether analyst coverage positively or negatively affects accounting conservatism. We find strong evidence that analyst coverage is positively associated with accounting conservatism. The results show that firms choose more conservative methods when they are followed by more analysts than when they are followed by fewer analysts. We find similar results after allowing for issues including the autocorrelation of time-series data, the endogeneity of analyst coverage, and the effect of the competing governance mechanisms. We also find that the extent to which negative cash flow from operations is more timely recognized via accruals than positive cash flow from operations (i.e., another proxy for accounting conservatism) is higher for firms with high analyst coverage than for firms with low analyst coverage. Our findings suggest that the effect of analysts' monitoring role on accounting conservatism is greater than that of analysts' information intermediary role.
This study makes the following contributions to the literature. First, this study provides an answer to the question of whether high analyst coverage increases or decreases accounting conservatism. Since it is not clear whether analysts' monitoring role dominates over their information asymmetry role in firms' accounting choice, it is warranted to document empirical evidence on this issue. Second, our study extends the limited research on the corporate governance role of analyst coverage by focusing on conservative accounting choices. This study provides further evidence on analysts' governance role by examining the effect of analyst coverage on accounting conservatism. Third, this study also adds to the research into the economic determinants of accounting conservatism. This is the first study to examine whether analyst coverage is an economic determinant of accounting conservatism. Our study provides further evidence that corporate governance exhibits a positive impact on accounting conservatism.
This study provides some implications for practitioners. Our study implies that financial analysts in the capital market may protect the interests of investors. Policymakers and regulators may increasingly support the development of the financial analyst profession as watchdogs. Managers should constrain their opportunistic behavior as external governance mechanisms including analyst coverage can effectively monitor them.
